Multi-scanner Antivirus systems provide insightful information on the nature of a suspect application; however there is o en a lack of consensus and consistency between di erent Anti-Virus engines. In this article, we analyze more than 250 thousand malware signatures generated by 61 di erent Anti-Virus engines a er analyzing 82 thousand di erent Android malware applications. We identify 41 di erent malware classes grouped into three major categories, namely Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown or Generic signatures. We further investigate the relationships between such 41 classes using community detection algorithms from graph theory to identify similarities between them; and we nally propose a Structure Equation Model to identify which Anti-Virus engines are more powerful at detecting each macro-category. As an application, we show how such models can help in identifying whether Unknown malware applications are more likely to be of Harmful or Adware type.
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tablets have become part of our daily life. e number of such smart devices keeps growing year a er year 1 . Android is the most popular mobile operating system and has grown into a diverse ecosystem worldwide.
Unfortunately, the success of Android has also a racted malware developers: it is estimated that about a 12% of apps in the Google play market are "low quality apps" 2 , many of them represent a real risk for the smartphone owner.
ere exist in the literature many systems to detect Android malware using classical detection approaches. For example, in [17] , the authors have developed an Android Malware analysis tool and review malware behavior based on a 1-Million sample of Android applications, highlighting di erences between malware and goodware. Elish et al [8] have proposed a single-feature classi cation system based on user behavior pro ling. In general, Android permissions have had a wide coverage and works like [9, 23] analyze them in detail. 1 See h p://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-marketing-analytics/mobile-marketing-statistics/, last access: March 2017 2 See h p://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps, last access: July 2017 Concerning the use of Machine Learning (ML) techniques in the detection of malware, the authors in [2] have gathered features from application code and manifest (permissions, API calls, etc) and use Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to identify di erent types of malware families. In a di erent approach, the authors of [5] have proposed a system based on the di erential-intersection analysis of applications in order to spot duplicates.
Antivirus So ware has been persistently analyzed and tested. For instance, the authors in [12] have reviewed the key points in designing AV engines for mobile devices as well as how to avoid detection. In a di erent approach, Rastogi et al [21] have assessed whether AV engines fall for obfuscation a acks, nding many to be vulnerable to some kind of transformation a ack. e authors in [19] have performed data analytics on multi-scanner outputs for Android Applications to nd their behavior pa erns.
With the advent of AV multi-scanner tools, such as Meta-Scan, Virustotal or Androguard, any application can easily be analyzed by many di erent AV engines at once. For each detected application, these tools typically identify the AV engines who agged the application as malware, its type and other meta-data regarding the nature of the threat. Hence, multi-scanner tools enable simultaneous analysis of suspicious applications and provides some information to identify and deal with many types of malware. e authors in [3] perform a comparison of AV engines from VirusTotal by modeling AV con dence using a hyperexponential curve. In [10] , AV labels from VirusTotal are subject to temporal analysis using a collection of malware applications obtained through a honeypot network. Additionally, other studies [4, 6] have shown the advantages of using more than one AV engine to improve malware decisions, by means, for example, of multi-scanner tools.
Nevertheless, the authors in [14] recall the lack of agreement on which application each AV considers as malware.
Besides, Maggi et al. [18] extensively review the inconsistencies when assigning identi ers to similar threats across engines. In this light, the authors in [15] propose a combination scheme for multi-scanner detections based on a Generative Bayesian model to infer the probability of being malware for every sample, however no speci c label analysis is performed, and thus all threats are treated equally.
Several authors have analyzed and proposed categorization schemes for Android malware applications. In [29] the authors nd up to 49 distinct malware families whilst the authors in [25] propose a text mining approach to obtain and classify malware families according to application code. Similarly, Zheng et al propose in [28] a system for the collection and categorization of zero-day malware samples into di erent families. Also, the authors in [7] propose a system to classify malware samples according to their families.
Sebastián et al. [24] propose AVClass, a system to normalize AV labels from di erent vendors and determine the actual class out di erent detection outputs for the same applications. Nevertheless, AVClass does not link AV engines with their detections. Instead, it provides the frequency for each token and chooses the most probable one. Besides, AVClass removes common malware-related tokens. is way, tokens such as Adware or Trojan are removed and the information they carry is missed. Consequently, the output of AVClass gives a nal malware class output, but loses information on (AV, class) pairs in the process.
In this light, we develop an alternative label normalization methodology based on the well-known minhashing technique [16] . is system relies on the user to nally assign normalized labels by using python regular expressions over signatures. is way, unsupervised aggregation of signatures can be achieved, considerably reducing the supervising e ort of the researcher. en, such methodology will enable cross-engine analysis of malware classes to improve malware classi cation. In a nutshell, is work contributes to this aim with a twofold e ort:
Manuscript submi ed to ACM (1) We develop a methodology for signature normalization; that is, group together identi ers referring to the same threat but di ering on the actual labels because of AV engine inconsistencies.
(2) We model AV engine relationships using Structural Equation Models (SEM) across malware categories aiming at the improvement malware classi cation. e rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data collection and our AV signature normalization methodology. Section 3 inspects engines and signature tokens using correlations to unveil consensual subsets of entities. Section 4 develops di erent weighting models to evaluate engine performance of distinct malware categories.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main ndings of this work and highlights the most relevant conclusions.
DATASET DESCRIPTION AND SIGNATURE NORMALIZATION
In this article, the dataset under study comprises a total of 82, 866 di erent Android applications collected from Google Play by TACYT 3 in May 2015. All these applications are considered suspicious, as they have been agged by at least one out of 61 antivirus (AV) engines, including some of the most popular ones (e.g. McA ee, Trend Micro, etc.) as well as many others. ese engines have been anonymized to preserve privacy, i.e. every engine has been substituted consistently by one of the names in the range AV 1 , . . . , AV 61 throughout the paper.
When a malware engine detects a suspicious application, it provides a signature containing some meta-data, like its last scan date or malware class identi er. A total of 259, 608 signatures are obtained in our dataset (i.e. 3.13 signatures per application on average).
As an example, consider application no. 1, 345, agged by AV27, AV28 and AV58. Each AV engine provides di erent signatures, namely:
• AV27: a variant of Android/AdDisplay.Startapp.B
• AV28: Adware/Startapp.A
Clearly, all three engines consider app no. 1, 345 as an adware-like application, but the signature name convention is di erent for each engine. us, text processing and text mining techniques are necessary to convert signatures into a common format for analysis. Fig. 1 shows a wordcloud with the most popular AV-generated raw signatures and their frequencies (most popular keywords are shown with large font sizes). Apart from some common understandable signatures, most of them include di erent names which account for di erent types of malware and other non-malicious names (i.e. AndroidOS).
Cleaning and classification of AV signatures with Minhashing
Some signatures contain common substrings across di erent AVs, including related chunks of text regarding very common malware types such as "PUA" or "Trojan" to more speci c types such as "GingerMaster" or "FakeFlash" together with some related terms which do not refer to malware, namely AndroidOS or win32.
To extract meaningful information from signatures, we have developed a methodology to clean, unify and normalize detection identi ers into a xed subset of "identi er tokens" representing the most frequent keywords contained within the signatures. is process starts with conventional text-mining cleaning techniques of raw strings, including lower-casing, removing punctuation and domain-speci c stop-words (i.e. tokens providing no malware information) and spli ing each signature into tokens separated by dots. Up to this point, our methodology follows the steps of AVClass [24] .
Next, we use the well-known minhashing algorithm to group signatures together. e hashing trick or minhashing is a very fast algorithm for estimating how similar (in terms of Jaccard similarity) two sets are. Minhashing relies on spli ing strings into several chunks of the same length and computing a unique-output function (i.e. common hash functions like MD5 or SHA1) for each chunk. Consequently, each signature produces a set of numbers, the minimum of which is selected as the minhash. Finally, elements are grouped according to their minhashing values. Once the minhashing values are computed, the probability of two signatures falling in the same group is shown to approximate the Jaccard distance between them. e Jaccard distance between two sets A and B follows:
In other words, similar items will likely fall into similar minhash buckets. A detailed explanation of Minhashing, Jaccard distance and all these terms may be found in [16] .
We manually checked the resulting groups and developed a set of Python regular expressions to transform signatures into malware classes according to the unveiled pa erns. Since di erent signatures might contain di erent classes of malware, collisions may eventually occur within these rules. In this light, we established rule priority following rst match criteria over the sorted rules (in terms of speci city). For instance, consider the signature: "Adware.Android.AirPush.K".
is signature would fall into the category Airpush, since it is more speci c than Adware.
As a result, the generated classes group together similar pa ern signatures into a representative set of malware classes. In contrast to AVClass, our approach keeps track of the relationship between the AV and the malware class associated to the signatures. e following lists a short summary of the three broad categories, namely emphAdware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic, along with an explanation of the classes in each category.
• Adware is category includes those malware classes showing abusive advertisements for pro t. ere are in total 60, 538 applications tagged with at least one adware class. e Adware category involves most apps in the collection, suggesting than most malicious applications inside Google Play are adware-related apps. Fraud/osoneclick refers to a fraudulent application which a empts to increase number of ad clicks in the app by stealthily se ling ads in the background of user interactive applications. Finally, the Adware (gen) tag is a generic reference assigned to those samples only containing that known class.
• Harmful reats: is category includes more dangerous threats than simple adware, which may enrol the user in premium services or ex-ltrate data through permission abuses or other exploits. ere are 29, 675 applications labelled at least once in this category. Deng, SPR (Security and Privacy Risk) and Riskware are generic names given by di erent engines to ag apps that may unjusti ably require potentially harmful permissions or include malicious code threatening user privacy. Denofow and Cova are generic references to trojan programs which a empts to enroll users in premium SMS services. SMSReg is a generic way for some engines to ag applications that require SMS related permissions for ex-ltration or premium subscription.
FakeFlash, FakeInst or Fakeapp are names for applications that replicate the functionalities of other popular apps adding to their code malicious code or actions. Appinventor is a developer platform used to build and generate applications extensively preferred by malware developers. SWF stands for di erent versions of Shockwave Flash Player Exploits. Trojan (gen) is the generic reference of engines to trojan applications. GingerMaster is a well-known family of rooting exploits. Spy is a generic reference to applications incurring in data ex-ltration or similar spyware threats.
• Unknown/Generic: is category includes AV detections which do not include class-related information, either due to generic signatures from AVs or signatures not matching any rule in the dataset. ere are 23, 915 applications within this group. Unclassi edMalware, Virus, Heur (from heuristics), GEN (Generic Malware), PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application), Reputation, AppUnwanted (Application Unwanted) and Artemis are generic tags given by di erent engines in order to ag applications that are detected as not-speci ed threats.
Other includes the remaining applications which have not been classi ed due to the lack of signature pa erns.
As shown in the with only one AV engine involved.
Comparison with AVClass [24]
We cloned the AVClass [24] repository from Github 4 and checked its performance in our dataset. We observed that the AVClass system returned undetermined class (SINGLETON output) for 48, 743 cases in our dataset, which is more than 50% of the signatures. Oppositely, our methodology and AVClass agree on 24, 097 applications, roughly 29% of the dataset. In this light, both approaches provide some level of agreement, as most speci c classes match frequently within the clearly de ned detections.
However, AVClass returns a single class per application, but does not specify which AV engine is behind such decision. In our methodology, we keep the (AV engine, Malware class) pair to allow further analysis since, in some cases, di erent AVs disagree on some application (some may consider it as Adware while others consider the same application as Harmful reat for instance).
Some insights from detections
Let A denote an indicator matrix of size 82, 866 × 61 whose elements A i j ∈ {0, 1} are set to 1 if the i-th Android app has been agged by the j-th engine or 0 otherwise. Matrix A is indeed very sparse with only 5% of all the entries set to one.
On average, each application is detected 3.135 ± 3.46 engines, showing that the variability of application detection counts is enormous. e most active AV engines are AV27, AV58, AV7, AV2, AV30 and AV32, accounting for more than 10, 000 detections each. Concerning matrix B, we observe that out of the 43, 933 multi-detection applications, 63.26% of them are assigned to more than one class. In particular, these 27, 781 applications receive between 2 and 12 di erent class labels, showing some level of disagreement between AV engines.
ANALYSIS OF MALWARE CLASSES AND CATEGORIES
As stated before, there are 38, 933 Android apps agged by a single AV engine. Of the rest (those with two AV detections or more), in 16, 152 cases all AV detections agree on the same malware class, while the remiainng 27, 781 apps show some kind of disagreement between AVs. In fact, some authors have proven the existing lack of consensus of engines [14] as well as severe class naming inconsistencies among engines [18] .
In this section, we analyze whether any of the inferred classes di er just because of naming inconsistencies or they represent a set of independent classes.
Correlation of malware categories
Remark that the 41 malware classes have been classi ed into three large malware categories, namely Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic. e three categories are very broad and the nature of the malware involved can be di erent. Nevertheless, the detections in both Adware and Harmful categories separate malware into low-risk and high-risk malware classes, as Adware samples are typically controversial and not detected by all the engines in the same way whilst harmful classes indicate potentially major security risks, such as data leakage or economic loss.
In addition, the Unknown/General category integrates all those malware classes which do not refer to any speci c malware type, being just an indicator of undesired behaviors.
Let D refer to an 82, 866 × 3 matrix where D i j is an integer which accounts for the number of times the i-th application has received a detection in category Adware (j = 1), Harmful (j = 2) or Unknown (j = 3). Table 2 Interestingly, it seems that Unknown detections agged by some AV engines appear more o en with Harmful reats by other AV engines than with Adware cases, showing that Unknown detections are probably cases of Harmful reats.
is shall be further investigated in Section 4.
Identifying relationships with classes with graph community algorithms
Graph theory provides useful algorithms to study the relationships between objects within a network of entities. In our case, starting from matrix B de ned in Section 2.4 we compute its correlation matrix, i.e. Corr (B) and de ne a Graph G = (N , E) whose adjacency matrix is Corr (B) . us, graph G has 41 nodes (malware classes) and the weights of the edges are equal to the correlation values between malware classes.
Using node edge betweenness [11] , we group together nodes according to their correlation values to see which malware classes are close together. In order to avoid generating communities out of noise, we force all correlation values below some Corr min threshold to be equal to 0. 
MODELLING CONSENSUS
In this section, we further investigate on AV engines and malware categories using Structure Equation Models (SEM) to identify which AVs are more powerful at detecting Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic categories.
On weighting AV engines
In order to obtain a performance score per engine within our dataset, a collective AV model must consider how AV engines behave collectively in the sense that which AV engines are consistent with other and which ones typically disagrees with the rest. is idea is at the heart of the well-known Latent Variable Models (LVM) which assume the existence of some unobservable "latent" or "hidden" variable (i.e. whether an app is of malware category or not) which explains the underlying relation among the observed variables (i.e. the output of the AV engines).
ere exist di erent approaches to Latent Variable Modeling in the literature, such as generative models or Structural Equation Models (SEM). We have chosen the later due to its ease of use and approach, based on covariance approximation, which weight engines according on how consensual their detections are.
Typically, SEM assumes a linear regression model on the latent or hidden variable, namely Z sem :
where X AV i refers to the observed variables AVi weighted by coe cients ω i . In order to shape values to a probabilistic scale, we use the logistic function to translate the Z sem score into a probabilistic value (between 0 and 1), following:
Inference and Results
We generate three 0/1 matrices, one per category (Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic), of size Apps × AV s.
ese matrices are used for training three Z sem models using the R-library "lavaan" [22] , which estimates the ω coe cients by minimizing the di erence between the dataset covariance matrix and the covariance matrix from the generated model. e ω coe cients are shown in Fig. 5 for the three models.
e gure clearly unveils the existing di erences across engines: some AVs rank high scores at speci c categories, while others are terrible on all three categories. For instance, AV6 excels at harmful applications (coe cient 0.8) but has null properties (coe cient 0) for Adware or Unknown malware; AV6 is very good at Harmful reats (coe cients 0.8 for harmful threats and 0 for the other two categories) and AV41 is excellent with unknown categories (0.7). Other AV engines have acceptable coe cients for more than one category, such as AV1 or AV15. In fact, adware-detecting engines, appear with very high coe cients whereas unknown detections occur notably across most engines.
e picture also shows clearly that there is no AV engine in this collection which excels in the three categories at AV1  AV10  AV11  AV12  AV13  AV14  AV15  AV16  AV17  AV18  AV19  AV2  AV20  AV21  AV22  AV23  AV24  AV25  AV26  AV27  AV28  AV29  AV3  AV30  AV31  AV32  AV33  AV34  AV35  AV36  AV37  AV38  AV39  AV4  AV40  AV41  AV42  AV43  AV44  AV45  AV46  AV47  AV48  AV49  AV5  AV50  AV51  AV52  AV53  AV54  AV55  AV56  AV57  AV58  AV59  AV6  AV60  AV61  AV7  AV8 It is also worth noting the spikes of some AV engines at the Unknown category (see AV13, AV46, AV54, AV58 or AV60). Essentially, these engines do not provide information on Adware or Harmful reats, instead they output a generic malware signature, and therefore receive low weights on such categories.
Finally, as an example of application of the Z sem models, consider app no. 1, 144. is app has been agged as Adware by 20 AVs, as Harmful by AV47, and Unknown by AV22, AV39 and AV40. We can then apply eq. 1 to obtain the Z sem values for the three categories which yields: 
Checking the coe cients of these AV engines on each category in Fig. 5 , we observe that AV7, AV14 and AV36 have low coe cients for Adware, while AV4 and AV36 also have low coe cient values for Harmful and Unknown respectively.
Perhaps, the Harmful category is more likely according to the estimation provided by the SEM mmodel despite the app has more Adware detections. However, it is not clear whether or not this application represents a real risk to the user.
As a nal example, Android app 67, 119, which accounts 14 detections clearly votes on favor for the Adware category: With this dataset, we have:
• Presented a novel signature normalization methodology capable of mapping di erent AV signatures into 41 standardized classes.
• Analyzed the most frequent keywords and signature categories using text mining and minhashing techniques, and classi ed malware signatures into three categories: Adware, Harmful threats and Unknown/Generic.
• Identi ed groups of similar malware classes within the data using Community detection algorithms from Graph eory.
• Used Structural Equation Models to nd most powerful AV engines for each of the three malware category.
• Shown an application on how to use such SEM model to infer which Unknown-type applications are closer to Adware or Harmful type.
